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INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION TO 
REGULATE CORPORATIONS: A 
COMMENT ON MACEY 
Jill E. Fisch† 
INTRODUCTION 
It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to comment on Professor 
Macey’s paper.  My remarks focus on an earlier draft of Professor 
Macey’s paper and his oral remarks.1  Professor Macey makes two 
basic points.  First, he observes that crisis leads to regulatory change 
and identifies the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20022 as Congress’ regula-
tory response to the recent corporate governance scandals.  Second, 
he describes a type of competition among regulators in responding to 
the scandals, noting in particular the emergence of New York State 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer as a key player in initiating enforce-
ment activity.  On this latter point, he predicts that the federal gov-
ernment will ultimately eliminate the ability of state regulators such 
as Spitzer to play a major role in corporate governance or securities 
regulation.  Ultimately, the theme that encompasses both Professor 
Macey’s oral remarks and the final version of his and Professor 
O’Hara’s paper, is one of comparative institutional  
competence—identifying the institution best able to regulate corpo-
rate governance in today’s world. 
                                                                                                                  
† Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law and Director, Center for Corporate, Securities & 
Financial Law, Fordham Law School.  Copyright 2005 Jill Fisch. 
1 Positive Political Theory and Federal Usurpation of the Regulation of Corporate Gov-
ernance: The Coming Pre-emption of the Martin Act, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 587 (2005).  
This commentary is based on that presentation, and not on the final paper that he has published 
as part of this volume. 
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
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I.  CRISIS GENERATES REGULATORY CHANGE 
On the first point, Professor Macey is of course absolutely  
right—crisis does lead to regulation.  Crisis is a particularly important 
factor in generating regulatory change with respect to business law.  
The clearest example we have of that is the stock market crash of 
1929, which led Congress to enact the federal securities laws, the 
starting point of regulatory competition between the states and the 
federal government.  Prior to the adoption of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the states regulated 
corporations through state corporation laws and blue sky laws, and 
the stock exchanges regulated corporations through listing standards.   
The creation of the SEC itself is a byproduct of the federal securi-
ties laws.  Congress specifically explained when it passed the federal 
securities laws that it was responding to national emergencies like the 
stock market crash and the Great Depression, and the burdens that 
these events put on the public, on the market, on the federal govern-
ment, and so forth.3  More recent regulatory responses to crisis have 
included the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, adopted after investiga-
tions revealed widespread use of bribes by U.S. corporations operat-
ing overseas,4 and the proliferation of state anti-takeover laws adopted 
in response to the growth in hostile tender offers in the 1980s.5 
Why is crisis a substantial factor in producing regulatory change?  
One reason is that, from a public choice perspective, business is usu-
ally in a pretty good position to resist substantial new regulation.  
Crisis, at least in the short-term, upsets that balance.  Corporate gov-
ernance scandals—accounting, insider trading, excessive executive 
compensation packages—give business lobbyists a little less credibil-
ity.  Crisis empowers members of the public that typically do not have 
significant political power.  Crisis brings people with diverse interests 
together into interest groups.  And, of course, crisis increases the po-
litical saliency of the regulatory issues involved—a factor that is par-
                                                                                                                  
3 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2000).  As Congress 
stated in adopting the Act:   
National Emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and the dislocation 
of trade, transportation, and industry, and which burden interstate commerce and ad-
versely affect the general welfare, are precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by 
manipulation and sudden and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by ex-
cessive speculation on such exchanges and markets, and to meet such emergencies 
the Federal Government is put to such great expense as to burden the national credit. 
Id. 
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)-(3), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (2000). 
5 See William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 
(1998) (describing timing and process by which states adopted antitakeover legislation). 
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ticularly important in that many issues involving business regulation 
generally have low political saliency. 
If you look at the debate in Congress, leading up to the adoption of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, you see that the corporate governance crises had the 
effect of changing the different political dynamic.  Professor Macey 
does not draw a particular normative conclusion about this change.  
Many corporate executives have criticized Sarbanes-Oxley as an 
overreaction—imposing substantial compliance costs on the vast ma-
jority of law-abiding corporations based on the wrongdoing of a few 
bad apples.  Other commentators argue that self-dealing by corporate 
executives was widespread and that regulatory reforms were long 
overdue.  In evaluating the consequences of regulatory reforms that 
respond to crises, one interesting question is whether the effect of 
those reforms will outlast public memory of the crises that generated 
them.   
The recent corporate governance scandals did more than motivate 
regulatory reform; they shifted institutional participation in the regu-
latory process.  Congress has taken a more significant role, removing 
certain corporate governance issues from state regulation and mandat-
ing specific governance initiatives by the SEC and the self regulatory 
organizations (SROs).  At the same time, state regulators, particularly 
Attorney General Spitzer, have initiated enforcement actions with 
respect to securities issues that have typically been left to the SEC.  It 
is this shift, and its effect on institutional competition, to which I turn 
in Part II.   
II.  COMPETITION AMONG REGULATORS 
Competition among regulators is an ongoing theme in corporate 
law.  Since the adoption of the federal securities laws in the 1930s, 
the federal government and the states have shared the responsibility 
for regulating corporations.  Well before the 1930s, the states com-
peted with each other for regulatory authority through the mechanism 
of charter competition.  New Jersey was the early leader in that com-
petition, but was subsequently displaced by Delaware.  Delaware re-
mains the dominant supplier of state corporate law to date, despite 
some efforts by states such as Nevada to attract charter business away 
from Delaware. 
Thus, institutional competition to regulate corporations is not a 
new theme.  Mark Roe has written about the delicate balance between 
federal level regulation, by the SEC and Congress, and state regula-
 1/21/2005 4:54:56 PM 
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tion.6  Roe argues that, because Congress has the power to preempt 
state level regulation, Congress can effectively compete with the 
states even without formal legislation, because the prospect of such 
legislation constrains state regulatory discretion.  Essentially, as Roe 
explains, Delaware and other states cannot depart too far from the 
federal ideal, or Congress will push back.   
The Spitzer investigations and enforcement actions represent the 
opposite side of Mark Roe’s analysis—the push back from the states 
in response to perceived inadequacies in federal enforcement activity 
with respect to misconduct typically regulated by the SEC and the 
SROs.  First, Spitzer investigated conflicts of interest among research 
analysts, uncovering extensive problems among large Wall Street 
Investment Banks and ultimately engineering a $1.4 billion global 
settlement with ten of the banks.7  Subsequently Spitzer uncovered 
widespread practices of late trading and market timing in the mutual 
fund industry.8  Spitzer’s enforcement actions addressed issues about 
which federal regulators were aware, but nevertheless had failed to 
act.  Indeed, at the same time that the SEC is moving to extend its 
regulation of the mutual fund industry and impose some of the same 
restrictions on hedge funds, Spitzer’s actions suggest serious defi-
ciencies in mutual fund regulation. 
Spitzer’s actions have, in turn, generated a federal pushback, al-
though perhaps not of the type envisioned by Roe.  In addition to hav-
ing the effect of embarrassing federal regulators, the Spitzer investi-
gations have been quite unpleasant for securities firms who are cur-
rently seeking to have Congress curb Spitzer’s enthusiasm for clean-
ing up the securities markets.  There is actually legislation on the ta-
ble, such as H.R. 2179, the Securities Fraud Deterrence and Investor 
Restitution Act, that limit Spitzer’s ability to compete with the SEC to 
regulate misconduct in the securities industry.   
Professor Macey tells this story and offers the prediction that Con-
gress will reduce or eliminate institutional competition from state 
regulators like Spitzer through legislation.  The scope of current insti-
tutional competition goes quite a bit further, however.  Spitzer has 
also entered into a turf war with the SEC and the federal government 
on the dual issues of self-regulation in the securities industry and ex-
                                                                                                                  
6 Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
7 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, SEC, NY At-
torney General, NASD, NASAA, NYSE and State Regulators Announce Historic Agreement to 
Reform Investment Practices (December 20, 2002), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/dec/dec20b_02.html. 
8 Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, State Investi-
gation Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud (September 3, 2003), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. 
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ecutive compensation, addressing both with his litigation challenging 
former NYSE CEO Richard Grasso’s compensation package.9 
There are two ways to look at Spitzer’s actions here.  First, on the 
subject of self-regulation, the New York Stock Exchange and the 
NASD have traditionally had extensive regulatory authority, subject 
to SEC oversight.  This means that even though the big broker dealers 
have extensive operations on Wall Street,  and have a substantial im-
pact on the economic condition of New York, the NYSE CEO and 
Board have substantially greater regulatory power over them than 
state regulators such as Spitzer.  Moreover, although the SEC ostensi-
bly supervises self-regulation, there are areas such as market regula-
tion in which that supervision has been extremely light.10  Spitzer’s 
lawsuit can be seen as a reassertion of authority over a key New York 
State industry.  Indeed, although Grasso argued that a federal court 
should hear the case because of the SEC’s role overseeing the stock 
exchange, that argument was rejected by a federal judge who sent the 
case back to state court.11 
Alternatively, by challenging Grasso’s pay package, Spitzer may 
be trying to stake out a role in regulating executive compensation.  
Although the regulation of executive compensation is traditionally 
considered a component of state corporate law, most of the major 
regulatory initiatives have occurred at the federal level.12  The SEC 
has sought to address excessive executive compensation through dis-
closure requirements.  Similarly, Congress has restricted the amount 
and form of executive compensation through provisions in the inter-
nal revenue code.  These regulatory efforts have been widely criti-
cized as ineffective; indeed, some commentators argue that these ef-
forts have exacerbated the problem.13  Grasso has responded through 
                                                                                                                  
9 See Complaint, People v. Grasso (N.Y. Sup. Ct., filed May 24, 2004), available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2004/may/may24a_04_attach.pdf.   
10 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The Failure of 
the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 315 (1985) (arguing that SEC has failed 
to take significant steps to deregulate the securities markets despite an explicit congressional 
mandate that it do so). 
11 Associated Press, Update 4: Grasso Lawsuit Sent to State Court, Dec. 10, 2004, avail-
able at http://www.forbes.com/associatedpress/feeds/ap/2004/12/10/ap1703935.html.  Federal 
District Court Judge Gerald Lynch held that “[p]ermitting a state government to enforce the 
corporate governance norms under which an exchange or self-regulating organization is estab-
lished violates no policy embodied in the federal securities laws.”  Id. 
12 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litiga-
tion, 34 GA. L. REV. 745, 761-63 (2000) (describing federal and state regulation of executive 
compensation). 
13 E.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Commentary, Stakeholder Values, Disclosure, and Mate-
riality, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (1998). 
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a different route, using an obscure provision of state not-for-profit 
law.14 
The Grasso litigation is another example of the kind of dynamic 
that Professor Macey is talking about—institutional competition 
among regulators to address corporate governance issues.   Arguably 
both SRO supervision and executive compensation are areas in which 
one could criticize the level of SEC enforcement activity, and 
Spitzer’s lawsuits represent exactly that type of challenge.   
The state level pushback extends beyond Attorney General Spitzer.  
On the specific subject of executive compensation, we see a response 
by the Delaware courts in the Disney case.15  After years of giving 
limited scrutiny to claims that executive compensation is excessive, 
courts in Delaware have seized upon the duty of good faith as a po-
tential mechanism for increasing their oversight of the compensation 
process.   
A broader example is in the area of securities litigation.  Over the 
past ten years, Congress has taken securities litigation away from the 
states, largely in response to claims of excessive or frivolous litiga-
tion.16  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) im-
posed a heightened pleading standard and other substantive and pro-
cedural barriers to private civil claims for federal securities fraud.17  
When investors sought to bypass the restrictions of the PSLRA by 
litigating in state court, Congress passed the Securities Litigation Uni-
form Standards Act, which preempted most state court claims for 
securities fraud.18    At the same time, commentators have argued that 
federal securities litigation has developed into the primary mechanism 
for regulating corporate governance.19 
Now states are pushing back against the federalization of securities 
fraud.  We see an increasing use by plaintiffs of state “holders” litiga-
tion, in which plaintiffs recast their claims as breaches of fiduciary 
duty and then, relying on a narrow carve-out in the PSLRA, bring 
                                                                                                                  
14 N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT-CORP. LAW § 202(a)(12) (McKinney 1998).  This section au-
thorizes non-profit corporations to pay only “reasonable compensation” that is “commensurate 
with services performed.” 
15 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
16 See Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search of Liability Stan-
dards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1305 (1999) (describing the evolu-
tion away from States’ securities litigation power). 
17 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1998)). 
18 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. ). 
19 Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: 
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 860-61 (2003). 
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those claims in state court.20  “Holders” litigation offers a mechanism 
for recapturing some control over corporate governance at the state 
level in state courts.   
III. PUBLIC CHOICE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 
Professor Macey goes on to evaluate this institutional competition, 
relying heavily on a public choice analysis of the SEC.  He has, of 
course, written extensively in this area,21 and as he sees it, institu-
tional competition is largely about interest groups and rent seeking.  
With respect to the SEC, Professor Macey is particularly concerned 
about agency capture.  He identifies the revolving door between the 
SEC and the securities industry.  Potentially more significant is the 
role of the powerful investment banks.  Corporate America has typi-
cally been very successful in constraining SEC regulatory initiatives.  
The Business Roundtable successfully litigated to overturn the SEC’s 
one share, one vote rule.22  The Chamber of Commerce is challenging 
the SEC’s independence requirements for mutual fund boards.23  Cor-
porate opposition has, to date, blocked the SEC’s proposal to allow 
direct shareholder nomination of directors.  Similarly, with respect to 
analyst conflicts of interest, mutual fund trading practices, and so 
forth, Professor Macey identifies the risk that the SEC’s views will be 
dominated by the powerful investment bank interest group.  He con-
cludes from this that, in the long run, Spitzer’s enforcement efforts 
are doomed.  They are doomed because they represent state intrusions 
into the SEC’s turf, a turf on which investment banks have tradition-
ally been better protected from aggressive regulation.     
But the story is a bit more complex.  First, from an interest group 
perspective, it is a mistake to focus exclusively on investment banks.  
The key factor in the current regulatory environment is that the corpo-
rate governance scandals have destabilized the political dynamic, 
increasing the power of a variety of other interest groups, including 
shareholders, corporations, trial lawyers, and employees.  A prime 
                                                                                                                  
20 See, e.g., Small v Fritz Cos., 65 P.3d 1255 (Cal. 2003) (recognizing a state law claim 
for “holders” of securities who were induced not to trade because of alleged fraud).   
21 E.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 242-44 (1986) (describing 
how the public can control special interest legislation through institutional mechanisms such as 
constitutions); Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of 
Market Exchange, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 45-47 (1988) (describing an economic theory of 
legislation in which “politicians maximize the aggregate political support they receive from all 
interest groups”). 
22 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
23 See Andrew Countryman, Mutual Fund Independence Regulation Challenged, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 3, 2004, at 1 (describing the litigation). 
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example is the way in which employee pension losses in Enron has 
caused a dramatic re-evaluation of the fiduciary obligations of pen-
sion fund managers.   
If the political arena functions more or less as market, the empow-
erment of other interest groups increases the competition for political 
advantage.  Some of the groups that have taken a heightened interest 
in corporate governance are groups that already enjoy a significant 
amount of political influence, such as the AARP and labor union pen-
sion funds.  Their empowerment and attention should reduce the abil-
ity of investment banks to use their political power to generate or 
maintain rents.   
Second, and this relates to the previous discussion of institutional 
competition, the effect of interest group competition must also be 
evaluated on a comparative basis.  In particular, one has to question 
whether state regulators can conceivably pose a meaningful threat in 
the long run, considering the political power of the investment bank-
ing and U.S. business interests.  It should virtually always be easier 
for an industry, such as the financial services industry, to capture the 
state level of regulation than to capture the Congress and the SEC.   
We saw an example of this with respect to state anti-takeover regu-
lation.  Although corporate interest groups pushed hard in Congress 
for federal legislation restricting hostile takeovers, they were largely 
unsuccessful.  In contrast, state legislatures passed extensive anti-
takeover regulation.24  Indeed, Ohio has some notable and distinctive 
statutory anti-takeover provisions, including an explicit rejection of 
Delaware’s heightened standard of review for management defensive 
actions.25   
Similarly, the financial services industry must have considerably 
more political power in New York State than in Congress where other 
competing interest groups have a fair amount of political capital.  As 
Spitzer prepares to run for governor, he will also be increasingly 
aware of the economic power of the Wall Street banks.  As with take-
overs, a congressional response to state regulation is likely to be more 
costly from a public choice perspective than state level action. 
On the normative side, the question that Professor Macey’s public 
choice analysis puts on the table is the question of comparative insti-
tutional competence.  From a normative perspective, who is the right 
regulator?  Will Congress, the SEC, the SROs, or the states do the 
best job in improving corporate governance and reducing the potential 
for future misconduct?  Of course, this question requires us to make 
                                                                                                                  
24 See Carney, supra note 5. 
25 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C) (2004). 
 1/21/2005 4:54:56 PM 
2005] INSTITUTIONAL COMPETITION TO REGULATE CORPORATIONS 625 
some hard decisions, both about our objectives and about the most 
suitable method of achieving those objectives.  On the goal  
side—should regulators place the greatest emphasis on efficiency, on 
uniformity, on freedom of contract, on the protection of small inves-
tors, or something else?  On the methodology side, how are these 
goals best obtained?  The SEC has traditionally emphasized transpar-
ency and disclosure.  State courts, particularly the Delaware courts, 
have focused on process and independence.  The SROs, especially the 
New York Stock Exchange, pay the most attention to market struc-
ture.  In Sarbanes-Oxley, Congress places a premium on financial 
accounting.   
These institutional differences highlight an additional benefit of 
institutional competition—specialization.  The presence of multiple 
regulators creates a broader scope of regulation while maintaining the 
high level of expertise required by the capital markets.  Indeed, the 
very dispersion of regulatory responses to the corporate governance 
scandals offers a powerful reason to reject the search for the ideal 
institution to anoint as the dominant regulator.  Only time will allow 
us to identify which institution has responded most effectively, but by 
maintaining regulatory competition, we increase the likelihood of an 
effective response. 
CONCLUSION 
In examining the varied regulatory responses to the corporate gov-
ernance scandals and, in particular, the turf war between Attorney 
General Spitzer and the SEC, Professor Macey focuses on institu-
tional choice.  For him, the scandals highlight questions about the 
SEC’s vulnerabilities as a regulator and suggest that, because those 
vulnerabilities are the product of interest group influence, they are 
likely to dominate the temporary political instability generated by the 
recent crisis.   
This comment suggests that crises create instability not just within 
interest group competition but within the balance of authority among 
competing institutional regulators.  In business regulation, this insta-
bility is particularly effective in overcoming a substantial status quo 
bias.  The resulting regulatory competition offers valuable experimen-
tation and innovation with respect to potential regulatory solutions 
and, ultimately, a powerful defense to the broad allocation of regula-
tory authority among competing institutions such as Congress, the 
SEC, the NYSE, and the states.   
 
